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What Aid Can’t Do: Reply to Ranis
David B. Skarbek and Peter T. Leeson
Gustav Ranis addresses our recent article in this journal where 
we argued that foreign aid is unable to solve the economic problem 
and thus unable to make poor countries rich (Skarbek and Leeson 
2009). The following quotations from his article summarize his 
main objections to our argument:
Instead of the MCC’s [Millennium Challenge Corporation’s] 
present grants-for-projects approach, favored by Easterly and 
Skarbek and Leeson, policy-based program lending or grants 
should be relied upon.
Skarbek and Leeson are ready to throw the baby out with the 
bath water. While foreign aid as presently practiced is admit-
tedly fl awed, there is no reason not to encourage at least this 
promising new window [a modifi ed MCC] as a potentially 
valuable component of our long-term foreign policy arsenal 
[Ranis 2011].
We have two replies to Ranis’s remarks. First, while we cannot 
speak for William Easterly, we can speak for ourselves. And we 
can say unequivocally that neither of us favors a grants-for-projects 
approach to foreign aid.  Second, we question the ability of a 
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modifi ed MCC to address the plight of poor people in developing 
countries.
The Problem with a Grants-for-Projects Approach
The thrust of our original paper—which asked the simple 
question “What can aid do?”—was that no foreign aid initiative 
can solve the economic problem societies must solve to climb 
from poverty. That problem requires identifying the resource 
allocation that maximizes resources’ value to society. Grants for 
projects do not help us identify this. They are an example of 
what aid can do—increase a predetermined output by devoting 
more resources to its production—not what aid must do to make 
poor countries rich, which is to solve the economic problem 
stated above. Whether developed countries should use aid to 
increase a predetermined output by devoting more resources to 
its production is a normative question. Our original argument 
analyzed a positive one.
Markets solve the economic problem required to make poor 
countries rich. But markets require a system of private property 
rights. Developing countries lack such a system. That is why they 
are undeveloped.
If the major impediment to developing countries adopting 
a system of private property rights were a lack of fi nances, aid 
could contribute to relieving poverty indirectly by fi nancing the 
creation of such a system—assuming that all relevant parties had 
the incentive to use it for the purpose. But we doubt that is the 
case. As Peter Bauer (2004) pointed out, every rich country in the 
world was once poor. Yet somehow their governments managed 
to develop systems of private property protection despite their 
poverty and without external assistance. 
There is another reason it is strange to see governmental 
resource constraints as the main impediment to private property 
protection in developing countries: The greatest violators 
of private property rights in developing countries are their 
governments. If developing-country governments want to secure 
property rights in their countries, there is a simple step they can 
take: stop meddling in citizens’ economic activities and stealing 
from them.
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Improving the Plight of the Poor
Our second response to Ranis addresses the ability of his 
envisaged, modifi ed MCC to improve the plight of poor people in 
developing countries. Ranis would like an MCC that “act[s] like a 
bank.” Developing-country governments would apply to this bank-
like MCC with a package-of-reforms proposal. If the MCC deemed 
a proposal worthwhile, it would loan that government money.
While we share Ranis’s assessment that the existing MCC has 
failed to improve the plight of poor people in developing countries, 
we do not share his optimism about a bank-like MCC’s ability 
to do this. There are two possibilities: (1) a developing-country 
government credibly commits to stop plundering its citizens and 
to devote its energies to protecting their private property rights; 
(2) it does not credibly commit to stop plundering its citizens and 
continues to devote its energies to violating their private property 
rights. 
In the fi rst case the MCC will (presumably) give the government 
a loan. But the government does not need the loan if it has truly 
committed to protecting citizens’ private property rights. Its 
citizens will become wealthy without it. In the second case, the 
MCC will (presumably) not give the proposing government a loan. 
But in that case the proposing government’s citizens will continue 
to suffer in poverty. The policy-based lending that Ranis’s modifi ed 
MCC would engage in is peculiar if the MCC’s goal is to improve 
the plight of the poor.  It makes loans to countries whose citizens 
will soon become rich without them and refuses loans to countries 
whose citizens will continue to suffer in poverty. 
A bank-like MCC may just really be a glorifi ed agency for bribing 
developing-country governments. It pays corrupt politicians to stop 
being corrupt. If corrupt politicians could credibly commit to stop 
being corrupt after receiving an MCC bribe, this could work. But it 
is unclear how corrupt politicians could do that. And we don’t think 
this is what Ranis has in mind.
Conclusion
Foreign aid cannot solve the economic problem. That requires 
markets, which require private property rights. If a developing-
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country government protects private property rights, that country 
will become rich. If it does not, that country will remain poor. A 
bank-like MCC that conditions aid on governments undertaking 
reforms that establish property protection gives aid only to countries 
that do not need it. Aid would not be solving the economic problem 
in such countries. Markets grounded private property rights would 
be. And, last we checked, markets grounded in private property 
rights did not require aid. In his article’s title, Ranis asks if we are 
giving up on aid. The short answer is, yes, we are giving up on aid 
but embracing markets grounded in private property rights.
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